Friday, 7:50 a.m. At a parts distributor in Laval, the dispatcher can't open the order file. Every folder on the server now holds a new text file: "Your files have been encrypted."
Who calls whom? Who decides to unplug the server? Who has the insurer's number? What do you tell the customers expecting their parts on Monday?
If your team can't answer those questions on a quiet Tuesday, it will struggle on a Friday in the middle of a crisis. A tabletop exercise lets you rehearse the crisis to find the gaps. Here's a how-to guide and a ready-to-run script built for a Canadian business with 20 to 50 employees.
TL;DR
- A tabletop exercise is a guided discussion around a fictional scenario: no systems are touched.
- The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends exercises to test your incident response plan, and reviewing the plan every year.
- Two hours, five to eight people, a facilitator and a note-taker are enough.
- The deliverable that matters: three to five actions, each with an owner and a deadline.
What is a tabletop exercise?
A tabletop exercise is a session in which decision-makers walk through a fictional cyberattack scenario, step by step, to check that their response plan holds up.
In its ITSAP.40.003 publication, updated in January 2026, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security says to "develop exercises to test your plan and response," and to test, revisit and revise the plan annually. Its ITSM.10.014 guidance goes further: "Run a tabletop exercise with the key employees identified in the plan."
It's neither a penetration test nor a phishing simulation: you're testing decisions, roles and communications. No plan yet? Start with our incident response plan template; the exercise can also help you build one.
Preparing the exercise: roles and logistics
Light preparation over two or three weeks is enough: set the objectives, bring the right people together and print what you'd need if the network went down.
| Role | Who, in a small business | What they do |
|---|---|---|
| Facilitator | An outside person or a manager who isn't playing | Reads the scenario, delivers the injects, asks questions, keeps time |
| Decision-maker | President or general manager | Makes the calls: shut systems down, notify, hire experts |
| IT | IT employee or IT provider | Explains what they'd do, with which access and how fast |
| Finance | Controller | Payroll, bank, insurer, emergency spending |
| Communications | Customer service or sales | Customers, staff, suppliers, media |
| Privacy lead | In Quebec, by default the person with the highest authority | Privacy incident, register, regulator notification |
| Note-taker | Assistant or observer | Records decisions, hesitations and missing information |
Before the session:
- Set two or three objectives, for example: reach the insurer in under 30 minutes, locate the latest offline backup, know who decides to notify the privacy regulator.
- Print the incident response plan and contact list. The Cyber Centre recommends alternate means of contact, such as mobile phone numbers.
- Invite your IT provider and, if possible, your insurance broker.
- Block two hours, phones away.
- Announce the ground rule: we're testing the plan, not the people.
The ready-to-run script: "The Friday ransomware"
This two-hour scenario follows a ransomware attack with data theft, a type of incident with an average cost of $330,000, according to industry data cited by Insurance Business Canada in October 2025.
Background (fictional): Laval Parts Inc., 35 employees. On-site file server, Microsoft 365, accounting software, biweekly payroll, external IT provider, cyber insurance policy.
| Time | Inject | Questions to ask |
|---|---|---|
| Friday, 7:50 a.m. | Server files won't open; a ransom note appears in every folder. | Who gets told first, and how? Who can authorize unplugging the server? |
| 8:30 a.m. | The IT provider confirms the server is encrypted, and so are the network-connected backups. They ask permission to cut internet access. | Where's the latest offline backup, and when was it last restored? What does cutting access stop? |
| 9:15 a.m. | Email from the attackers: they claim to have the customer list and payroll files and threaten to publish them in 72 hours. | Who calls the insurer? Do we need a lawyer? Who preserves the evidence? |
| 10:30 a.m. | A major customer calls about their orders. An employee has already posted on Facebook that "everything's been hacked." | Who talks to customers, and with what message? What do we tell staff? |
| 1:00 p.m. | Wild card: the president is on a plane, and the only Microsoft 365 admin account belongs to a former employee. | Who decides in their absence? How do we recover admin access? |
| Monday, 8:00 a.m. | Payroll files, including social insurance numbers, appear to have been copied. Payroll has to go out Thursday. | Is there a risk of serious harm? Who notifies the regulator and the employees? How do we pay on Thursday? |
Allow 10 to 15 minutes per inject. To compare your team's answers with the right reflexes, keep our article on the first 24 hours of a ransomware attack handy.
Facilitating without trapping: the ground rules
The facilitator gets people talking rather than correcting them: the goal is to reveal what the team would really do, including every "I don't know."
- Play with what you have. If nobody knows the insurer's number, look it up for real, and note how long it takes.
- Dig deeper. "We'd restore the backups" calls for a follow-up: which ones, tested when, by whom?
- Make a call. Every inject ends with a decision, even a provisional one, and the name of whoever made it.
- Stick to the schedule. Better to cut a debate short and note it than to skip the ending.
Monday's inject is the privacy moment. In Quebec, the privacy lead has to explain how they would record the incident in the register (Law 25, s. 3.8), assess the risk of serious injury, and notify the Commission d'accès à l'information and the people concerned "promptly" (s. 3.5); there's no fixed 72-hour deadline in Law 25. Outside Quebec, federal or provincial privacy law sets its own breach reporting and record-keeping rules, so adapt the inject. To make it concrete, fill in a mock entry in our incident register template. In a real incident, confirm your analysis with legal counsel.
After the exercise: the report and the actions
An exercise is only worth what changes afterwards: write a short report within a week, with three to five actions, each with an owner and a deadline.
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends a lessons learned document, and CISA's packages include an after-action report template. One page is enough: what worked, the gaps, the actions.
Typical actions after this scenario:
- Print the emergency contact list and the insurer's emergency hotline number.
- Create a second Microsoft 365 admin account, protected by a security key.
- Test a full restore from an offline backup.
- Prepare a template message for customers and another for staff.
- Put in writing who decides when the president is away.
Schedule the next exercise in 12 months with a different scenario: wire transfer fraud, a compromised Microsoft 365 account or a hacked IT provider.
Do you need an outside facilitator?
It isn't required, but an outside facilitator will ask the uncomfortable questions, and frees the owner to play their real role instead of running the session.
If you have no in-house security resource, our comparison of MSP, MSSP, vCISO and in-house options helps you decide who should own these exercises. Our ongoing security partner service keeps your roadmap and incident policies current throughout the year; let us know if you'd like to plan an exercise into it. The session works best in person: request an on-site visit.
Frequently asked questions
What is a cybersecurity tabletop exercise?+
It's a discussion session where an organization's decision-makers walk through a fictional cyberattack scenario, step by step, without touching any systems. The goal is to check that the response plan works, that everyone knows their role, and to find the gaps before a real incident. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends developing exercises to test your incident response plan.
How often should a small business run a tabletop exercise?+
At least once a year. The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends testing, revisiting and revising your incident response plan annually. Add an exercise after any major change: a new IT provider, a new payroll system, a move or a change in leadership.
Who should take part in a tabletop exercise at a small business?+
The people who would make decisions during a real incident: leadership, your IT staff or IT provider, finance, whoever talks to customers and the person responsible for privacy. Add a facilitator who doesn't play and a note-taker. Five to eight people is usually enough.
Where can I find a free tabletop exercise scenario?+
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) offers over 100 tabletop exercise packages (CTEPs), covering ransomware, phishing and insider threats among others, with objectives, scenarios, discussion questions and an after-action report template. The scenario in this article is adapted to a Canadian small business.
Sources
- 1.Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Developing your incident response plan (ITSAP.40.003)
- 2.Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Improving cyber security resilience through emergency preparedness planning (ITSM.10.014)
- 3.CISA: Tabletop Exercise Packages
- 4.Insurance Business Canada: AI-powered attacks push cyber risks higher for Canada's SMEs (October 2025)
- 5.LégisQuébec: Act respecting the protection of personal information in the private sector (P-39.1)